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A Systematic Interpretation of Hobbes’s  
Practical Philosophy
AbstrAct: Hobbes’s political philosophy departs from a number of premises that are sup-
posed to be self-evident, supplemented by various observations from experience. These 
statements are examined critically and in their interrelatedness in order to find out to what 
extent Hobbes provides a convincing system of thought. The importance of the basis of 
man’s actions, his self-interest, is inquired, since it serves as the basis of his practical phi-
losophy. After this, Hobbes’s views on ‘moral’ notions are expounded. As it turns out, Hobbes 
maintains a number of concepts that have such a connotation, but interprets these in a 
specific way. The article is concluded with a modest systematic reconstruction of Hobbes’s 
main thoughts in practical philosophy.
Introduction
In this article, the foundations of Hobbes’s practical philosophy are laid bare. His views 
are expounded in order to make it clear what his practical philosophy means and what 
its implications are. Practical philosophy can also be called ‘moral philosophy’, a term 
used by Hobbes himself,1 just as ‘moral law’.2 As will be shown, in Hobbes’s case 
this does not mean he fails to problematize the notions often dubbed ‘moral’, such as 
‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. In fact, his analysis of ‘moral philosophy’ is detrimental 
to any approach that does not explicate them. A number of viewpoints are presented 
in a more or less geometrical guise, in that axioms are used that are not proven but 
rather taken to be immediately clear, apparently not requiring a corroboration, on the 
basis of which an a priori system of thought is erected, although the role of experience 
is also considered.
First, I will briefly comment on Hobbes’s methodology in general, so that it will 
be clear how his empirical outlook may be reconciled with the presence of axioms. 
Then, in the second section, the basis of man’s actions is identified as self-interest. It 
is maintained that both consciously and naturally, one seeks out what is beneficial to 
oneself. This, one might say, somewhat meager approach to human motivation needs 
to be supplemented by an inquiry into the ‘moral’ notions, so that an alternative account, 
starting with them, is excluded. The third section is focused on that. Finally, the fourth 
section shows how the views presented are related.
1 E. g., Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (110).
2 E. g., Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 4, § 1 (76).
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The difficulty in (re)constructing a philosopher’s view thus is that no clearly demar-
cated model, waiting to be discovered, is extant. Hobbes does not present his ideas 
in the way I will expound them (otherwise, part of this article would be superfluous). 
Attempts have been made to put forward one’s ideas geometrically,3 or to systematize 
the thoughts of others in this fashion.4 This article is limited both in scope and ambi-
tion, not directed at Hobbes’s philosophy in its entirety but at its most important part, 
namely, his practical philosophy.
Moreover, an interpretation according to one’s own predilections looms. This dan-
ger is not great with Hobbes, who is usually clear and seldom ambiguous, providing 
elucidative examples in cases where misinterpretation might occur. The risk of a ‘tunnel 
vision’ or confirmation bias is reduced for the same reason. This doesn’t mean that 
misinterpretation may not still occur, but one has to make an effort and apply a pro-
crustean method, leaving none of Hobbes’s main points intact, in order to do so, which 
has, I think, nonetheless sometimes been done. That an interpretation is realized with 
which Hobbes himself would completely concur, which is, of course, the ideal, is not 
realistic – as one can only know what he wrote and must always interpret his words in 
some way – but in this contribution I shall make an effort, by working consistently and 
taking everything he says seriously, to come as close as possible.
1. The nature of practical philosophy’s axioms
Although Hobbes maintains that knowledge is acquired empirically, elements that may 
be qualified a priori in the modern usage are significant in his philosophy. He states 
knowledge of fact originally to be sense5 and the senses to be the sources of concep-
tions.6 Knowledge of consequences, alternatively, which is also presented as science, 
is considered to be of a conditional nature,7 especially since science is presented as 
“[…] the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another […].”8 
One may detect a precursory analysis to that of Hume, who reduces the objects of 
human reason to matters of fact and relations of ideas,9 although this parallel should 
not lead to a simplistic (and perhaps even procrustean) interpretation. In this case, too, 
experience is stated to be the origin: “[…] the understanding of [all manner of Sciences] 
(because CHRIST hath not delivered it) is to be learnt from reasoning, that is to say by 
making necessary consequences, having first taken the beginning from experience.”10
The English version of De Cive can, incidentally, be said to leave some doubt 
whether this really applies to all sciences, stating: “[…] all manner of Sciences, which 
(comprehended under the Title of Philosophy) are necessary partly to live, partly to 
live well […].”,11 although the comma before ‘which’ may indicate an amplifying clause 
and hence confirm this; the issue at hand, however, is whether reasoning necessarily 
 3 Notably, Benedictus de Spinoza’s Ethica ([1677], 1925).
 4 Spinoza may serve as an example here, again (Benedictus de Spinoza, Renati Des Cartes Principio-
rum Philosophiae Pars I & II ([1663], 1925)).
 5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 7 (47)
 6 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 1 (13), Ch. 3 (20); cf. Ch. 2 (15)
 7 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 7 (47)
 8 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 5 (35)
 9 David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding ([1748], 2000), Section 4, Part 1 (35)
10 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 17, § 12 (229)
11 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 17, § 12 (229)
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starts with experience. This is not per se the case if one follows the presentation in the 
English version (it may contingently be the case that reasoning starts thus), but the 
Latin version is clearer in this respect, stating: “Horum scientia […] ratiocinatione, id est, 
texendo consequentias initio sumpto ab experientiis, addiscenda est.”,12 which renders, 
literally translated: “the understanding of these […] is to be learned by reasoning, that 
is, by joining consequences having taken the beginning from experiences.” The phrase 
‘id est’ (‘that is’) makes it clear that a necessary connection is taken to exist here.
To return to the general point, the fact that experience serves as the basis of 
knowledge doesn’t mean that interpreting (part of) Hobbes’s philosophical enterprise 
as being based on (presumably) self-evident starting-points is doomed to fail. First, the 
interpretation is a construction (namely, by the interpreter of his thoughts), in which the 
results are not necessarily presented in the same way Hobbes himself did. Secondly, 
related to this, the fact that (factual) knowledge is acquired empirically doesn’t mean 
that such a system cannot be realized, albeit, in that case, afterwards. Thirdly, Hobbes 
may be said to have argued that political philosophy should be developed mathemati-
cally.13 Fourthly, Hobbes adduces the existence of self-evident truths: “It is of it selfe 
manifest, that the actions of men proceed from the will […].”14
Difficultly, however, he does acknowledge primary propositions, but characterizes 
them as definitions,15 stating that axioms do not fit this qualification.16 In Leviathan, it 
is made clear that definitions need to be used in order to reach scientific statements;17 
“[…] a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he 
uses stands for; and to place it accordingly […].”18 Significantly, Hobbes points to the 
problematic conclusions that may be reached if one starts with definitions, but he 
limits this to situations in which ‘wrong’ definitions are used. In fact, I think the use of 
definitions is more problematic than Hobbes proposes, but this is not the place for a 
detailed analysis of that issue.
2. Self-interest
As was pointed out, Hobbes dismisses axioms, although he accepts the possibility, and 
even existence, of self-evident truths. A number of basic starting-points, which may, I 
think, irrespective of Hobbes’s prima facie qualification, be qualified as axioms, are, as 
I will try to demonstrate, implicitly present in his practical philosophy.
The most basic axiom can be found by inquiring on what basis people act. Obviously, 
their actions have a great number of goals, and even organizing these goals may leave 
many categories. Still, Hobbes maintains that all voluntary actions have something in 
common, namely that they are based on self-interest: “[…] of the voluntary acts of every 
man, the objects is some Good to himselfe.”19 (It would, in my opinion, be a mistake 
12 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the Latin version) ([1647], 1983), Ch. 17 § 12 (261)
13 Leo Strauss, Hobbes’ politische Wissenschaft in ihrer Genesis (2001), 157, 158
14 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 5, § 1 (85
15 Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore ([1655], 1839), Pars 1, Cap. 3, § 9 (33); Cap. 6, § 13 (72)
16 Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore ([1655], 1839), Pars 1, Cap. 3, § 9 (33)
17 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 7 (48)
18 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 4 (28)
19 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 14 (93) (cf. Ch. 15 (105)); The Elements of Law 
([1650], 1840), Part 1, Ch. 3, § 6 (99); De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 2, § 8 (55)
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to claim that self-interest has practically disappeared in Leviathan,20 particularly if this 
is partly based on the fact that the specific objects for people vary,21 since this merely 
means that the content of the motivations differs.)
On the basis of this presentation, it may be thought that this is a contingent given 
– man happens to want something for himself – but Hobbes specifies that this is a 
natural process (which also includes non-voluntary actions): “[…] every man by nature 
seeketh his own benefit, and promotion […].”22 Moreover, man necessarily acts in a 
self-interested manner: “[…] every man, by naturall necessity desires that which is 
good for him […].”23
Some empirical evidence is put forward, but not in such a way that a decisive 
conclusion is reached if experience serves as the standard. That this is not the stan-
dard, and the self-interest premise is indeed an axiom, is the only alternative; that this 
approach is opted by Hobbes also follows from the following formulations: “[…] every 
man is presumed to seek what is good for himselfe naturally […].”;24 “[…] every man 
is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit […].”25 This stance has both 
strengths and weaknesses. The a priori manner of observing behavior has the benefit 
that a definite conclusion is reached, rather than one in which conclusive results are 
not always to be expected, as in empirical investigations, in which one usually has to 
settle for a provisional outcome, to be complemented and specified by further research.
This benefit is at the same time its downside, however: how can one say anything 
about man’s actions without (extensively) inquiring the actual behavior? One may argue: 
“No axiom demonstrates that people make choices that serve their best interests; this 
is a question to be answered based on evidence.”26 Part of the problem is removed if 
one focuses on the analysis of the notions. In this way, an action (or, rather, the agent) 
may simply be dubbed self-interested, even reducing pity to one’s own position, stating: 
“Griefe, for the Calamity of another, is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the 
like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the 
phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FELLING […].”27 The analysis is consistent: from 
the fact that one imagines one’s own suffering, one suffers as well (com-passion). No 
room is left in Hobbes’s viewpoint for actions that would primarily seem to be directed 
at others’ benefit, such as sacrificing oneself, particularly since it is against reason to 
give up one’s life.28
These actions should be accounted for and should perhaps be qualified as self-
interested, albeit in another sense than the only one for which Hobbes leaves room. 
It would, e. g., be unimaginable in his line of thought that people sacrifice themselves, 
the more so since “[…] every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what 
20 F. S. McNeilly, “Egoism in Hobbes” (1966), 205
21 F. S. McNeilly, “Egoism in Hobbes” (1966), 205
22 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 19 (133)
23 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 1, § 13, (49). Hobbes mentions 
this in the context of his depiction of the state of nature, but the statement is of a general nature, 
and man’s drive is not merely thus in that situation, as is clear from the way man in the civil state is 
described (cf., e. g., Ch. 6, § 4 (93)).
24 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 3, § 21 (70)
25 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (109)
26 Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, Richard Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics” 
(1998), 1545
27 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 6 (43)
28 E. g., Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 1, § 7 (47).
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is evill, but chiefly the chiefest of naturall evills, which is Death; and this he doth, by a 
certain impulsion of nature, no lesse then that whereby a Stone moves downward […].”29 
Of course, strictly speaking, this situation doesn’t qualify as one in which a ‘voluntary 
motion’ is decisive, but rather an ‘animal motion’,30 but appetite and desire are decisive 
in both cases,31 and besides, it would be difficult to grasp, given Hobbes’s view of the 
object of man’s voluntary actions,32 how a voluntary action could counter this animal 
motion. Since an exposition on this matter would diverge too much from the present 
issue, I will leave it out here.
Finally, Hobbes says: “[…] the proper object of every man’s will, is some Good to 
himselfe.”33 The word ‘good’ is obviously not to be understood in a ‘moral’ sense. How 
Hobbes considers ‘moral’ notions will be indicated in section 3, but ‘proper’ might be 
taken thus, so that the sentence would be read as: ‘every man’s will should (‘morally’) 
be something he values.’ This would render the outcome that one should (‘morally’) 
act in one’s self-interest, which would be redundant, since he states, as was shown, 
that self-interest lies at the root of (voluntary) actions. Moreover, as I will argue in the 
next section, ‘moral’ notions are not maintained by Hobbes, at least not in the sense 
(expounded in the traditional approach) that they would have a meaning linked to 
something ‘good’ in an absolute sense, absolute standards being absent in this regard. 
‘Proper’ is, accordingly, to be understood here as ‘real’ (or ‘right’ in a non-‘moral’ sense).
3. The analysis of ‘moral’ notions 
If self-interest is in each case decisive, the question is pertinent whether actions based 
on ‘moral’ convictions are excluded. ‘Moral philosophy’ is, for Hobbes, the science of what 
is good and evil.34 In Leviathan, natural laws, which will be dealt with below, are called 
‘moral laws’, “[…] consisting in the Morall Vertues, as Justice, Equity, and all habits of 
the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity […].”35 ‘Moral laws’ are taken (broadly) to 
mean the laws that “[…] concern the manners and conversation of men, one towards 
another […].”36 In De Cive, the moral law is identified with the natural law.37 Gauthier 
rightly points to the specific (divergent) meaning of Hobbes’s ‘moral’ contentions: “[…] 
Hobbes’s concepts are practical, moral in so far as ‘moral’ means ‘practical’, ‘concern-
ing what to do’, but not in so far as ‘moral’ means ‘opposed or superior to prudential’.”38
29 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 1, § 7 (47); cf. The Elements of 
Law ([1650], 1840), Part 1, Ch. 1, § 6 (83). The notions ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are not qualified ‘morally’, since 
the issue is what is good (and evil) for every man. In section 3, this will be elaborated upon.
30 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 6 (38)
31 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 6 (38)
32 Cf. note 19, supra.
33 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 25 (176); cf. De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 
1983), Ch. 1, § 7 (47).
34 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007) Ch. 15 (110)
35 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 26 (197)
36 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law ([1650], 1840), Part 1, Ch. 5, § 1 (111)
37 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 4, § 1 (76)
38 David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (1969), 28. Cf. Gary Herbert, “The Non-normative Nature 
of Hobbesian Natural Law” (2009), 4: “What morality there is in Hobbes’s philosophy is political. It 
reduces to obeying the law or, in the state of nature, to a willingness to prefer peace.”
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How ‘virtue’ is treated and what ‘justice’ means, according to Hobbes, will be shown 
below. ‘Equity’ is simply linked to the given that an unequal treatment leads to war,39 and, 
irrespective of that, as appears from the quote, peace as the goal is the pivotal factor. 
Peace is not necessarily something ‘good’ and must, in the line of thought presented 
above, be considered to be the outcome of a selfish deliberation.
‘Charity’ is a somewhat difficult matter. Hobbes says little about this in both Leviathan 
and De Cive. It is clear that the sovereign must provide for (some) public charity.40 In 
the context of what Hobbes propagates, this is merely necessary in order to prevent 
the citizens from resisting the sovereign’s reign. After all, if he is unable to protect them 
(anymore), they are exempt from obedience to him.41 In De Cive, this is applied directly 
to the present issue, including happiness in the reasons to institute a government, the 
sovereign acting against his self-interest if he should not support his subjects.42 The 
issue is somewhat complicated in this respect, since improving the subjects’ strength 
is also the sovereign’s mission.43 This may be carried through in general, charity sup-
posedly lessening the mutual threats between people. A beggar to whom some alms 
are given, e. g., is (ceteris paribus) less likely to rob someone than one who is not. 
Of course, this is speculative as Hobbes doesn’t mention this situation; moreover, in 
the state of nature, no property (in the strict sense) exists44 whereas in the civil state, 
the beggar should be kept from breaking the law except if he would otherwise die of 
starvation. Still, this interpretation of ‘charity’ appears to be most in line with Hobbes’s 
general argumentation.
Importantly, “Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; 
which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers 
men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and un-
pleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, 
or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life.”45
This might still leave the option of something existing as ‘good as such’ or ‘good in 
itself’, but Hobbes doesn’t refer to this and it plays no part in his practical philosophy. 
(He does exclude the existence of a ‘highest (or greatest) good’.46) A common ground 
can, then, be found, but only with regard to the way the actions are organized. A paral-
lel to the self-interest analysis is evident: people are all intent on finding pleasure and 
avoiding pain, but what exactly they seek varies from one case to the next. In the civil 
state, a standard is introduced, but artificially and without any ‘moral’ aspirations. In a 
common-wealth, the civil law serves as the measure of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.47
I argued that, according to Hobbes, at the basis of man’s actions lies self-interest, 
but the specific objects of these actions vary. He concretizes this somewhat when he 
defines ‘law of nature’: “A LAW OF NATURE (Lex naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall 
Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destruc-
39 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (108)
40 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 30 (239)
41 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 21 (153)
42 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 13, § 4 (158)
43 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 13, § 4 (158); cf. Leviathan 
([1651], 2007), Ch. 30 (240): “[…] The good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated.”
44 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 13 (90); cf. Ch. 24 (171).
45 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (110); cf. Ch. 6 (39); De Cive (the English version) 
([1651], 1983), Ch. 3, § 31 (74), Ch. 14, § 17 (177, 178).
46 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 11 (70)
47 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 29 (223); cf. Ch. 46 (469)
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tive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by 
which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”48 (In Leviathan, the indefinite article is 
used here, reserving the definite article for the actual laws of nature; in De Cive, less 
consistently, the definite article is used in the general description as well.49)
The inclination to survive has already been discussed. Reason doesn’t serve an-
other purpose than an instrumental one (dismissing, for example, a Kantian approach): 
“[…] REASON, [when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind], is nothing but 
Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names 
agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts […].”50; “[…] deliberation is 
nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the conveniences, and inconveniences 
of the fact that we are attempting; where, that which is more weighty, doth necessarily 
according to its inclination prevaile with us.”51
Reason as such doesn’t, consequently, provide ‘moral’ standards. The fact that 
the laws of nature – which are deemed theorems52 – are considered to be dictates 
of reason53 means that the outcome of deliberation ‘forces’ man to a course of ac-
tion, namely to preserve his life. One is ‘forbidden’, which seems to have some ‘moral’ 
connotation, but, given Hobbes’s other statements, this can only mean that this is the 
only reasonable course to take; reason forbids man to act thus as it would conflict with 
one’s self-interest. This is also the way it forbids (inter alia) theft and adultery.54 In De 
Cive, he does define the law of nature as “[…] the Dictate of right Reason […].”,55 but 
‘right reason’ is an instrumental faculty.56 Only by disregarding Hobbes’s observations 
on the ‘moral’ concepts can it be argued that there is a ‘moral’ obligation to obey the 
law(s) of nature.57 A link between his position in this respect and a Kantian imperative 
may be suggested, but only by producing an unfounded interpretation (circumventing 
the problems involved with taking the ‘moral’ notions at face value).58
The right of nature, which serves in Hobbes’s model as the counterpart to the laws 
of nature in that it presents the basic freedom in the state of nature, being restricted by 
the laws of nature – people realize that restricting this freedom is necessary in order to 
leave the state of nature – has no ‘moral’ value.59 It is defined as “[…] the Liberty each 
man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own 
Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his 
own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”60
48 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 14 (91)
49 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 2, § 1 (52)
50 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 5 (32)
51 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 13, § 16 (166)
52 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (111)
53 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (111)
54 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 14, § 10 (174)
55 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 2, § 1 (52)
56 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 2, § 1 (52)
57 Alfred Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes” (1938), 411
58 Alfred Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes” (1938), 409
59 Cf. Gary Herbert, “The Non-normative Nature of Hobbesian Natural Law” (2009), 15: “Natural right 
is a natural liberty only because there is no sovereign, mortal or Divine, to coerce one into acting 
otherwise. As such it is non-moral.”
60 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 14 (91); cf. De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 
1983), Ch. 1, § 7 (47). ‘Liberty’ is defi ned, ‘morally’ neutrally, as “[…] the absence of externall Impedi-
ments […].” (Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 14 (91).
Urheberrechtlich geschütztes Material. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar.  
Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitungen in elektronischen Systemen. 
© Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2011 
473A Systematic Interpretation of Hobbes’s Practical Philosophy
Hobbes does say: “The [natural] Law […], in the means to Peace, commands […] 
Good Manners, or the practise of Vertue: And therefore it is call’d Morall.”61 Significantly, 
the fact that peace is considered something good (in the sense of agreeable) is put 
forward as the reason why modesty, equity, trust, humanity and mercy are virtues: they 
are conducive to peace.62 Warrender claims that ‘right’ is used as (besides that which 
one cannot be obliged to renounce) that to which one is morally entitled, but fails to 
support this.63 By contrast, it is, in accordance with the line of thought presented, more 
compelling to say that “[…] the Hobbesian ‘moral’ system is nothing more than a system 
of common, or universal, prudence.”64
Harvey offers a partially convincing analysis, but seems to smuggle in traditional 
conceptions of ‘morality’. He rightly says that “[…] what Hobbes has done is recast the 
traditional understanding of moral virtue into a prudential, instrumentalist mold.”,65 and 
that “[…] the Laws of Nature require us to create a moral system that embodies objec-
tive claims of right.”66 Taking such a line of thought seriously seems difficultly reconcil-
able with the claim that ‘fair dealing’ and ‘propriety’ in the traditional sense would be 
involved.67 The unwarranted holding on to the traditional elements in this interpretation 
is clear in the following: “[…] we are rationally bound to abide by our moral obligations 
insofar as doing so leads to self-preservation, peace and the safe pursuit of felicity. 
Crucially, however, the moral obligations so incurred remain free-standing: each party 
to such voluntary agreements merits proper performance on the part of their fellows 
as their due. For Hobbes, moral obligation is an emergent but non-reducible property 
of rational obligation.”68
Zagorin’s approach suffers from the same problem. Criticizing, among others, 
Gauthier,69 he points to Hobbes’s view of the law of nature as incorporating “[…] a large 
body of morals and virtues, including peace and peacebleness, a concern for life, civility, 
benevolence, and equal consideration for others, that would have to be a part of any 
true system of morality, irrespective of its underlying philosophic principles.”70 I have 
above pointed to the meaning of peace, the concern for life, civility and benevolence 
for Hobbes. Equal consideration for others will be discussed below. It is, on the basis 
of the considerations in this section and the previous one, possible and would, I think, 
constitute the most convincing account, to present a consistent analysis of Hobbes’s 
thinking without clinging to traditional ‘moral’ categories.
The actual laws are important in order to know the foundation, according to Hobbes, 
of the common-wealth. Originally, people are supposed to live in a condition of war, in 
which the threat of combat is continuously present,71 and which they seek to escape 
by erecting a common-wealth.72 (It may be debated whether Hobbes considered this 
an actual situation or utilized it as a mere thought experiment. He points to America 
61 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 3, § 31 (75)
62 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 3, § 31 (74, 75); cf. The Elements 
of Law ([1650], 1840), Part 1, Ch. 4, § 14 (110).
63 Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1957), 18, 19
64 David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (1969), 98
65 Martin Harvey, “Hobbes’s Voluntarist Theory of Morals” (2009), 59
66 Martin Harvey, “Hobbes’s Voluntarist Theory of Morals” (2009), 59
67 Martin Harvey, “Hobbes’s Voluntarist Theory of Morals” (2009), 60, 62
68 Martin Harvey, “Hobbes’s Voluntarist Theory of Morals” (2009), 63
69 Perez Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature (2009), 47; 145, note 97
70 Perez Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature (2009), 48
71 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 13 (88, 89)
72 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 17 (117, 118)
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in his own time73 and, at the international level, the competition between nations.74 It 
is, for the line of thought presented in this article, not decisive whether the historical 
approach is opted.) The commands contained in the laws of nature presuppose that 
one has insufficient power to simply do what one wants (to continue living) without 
having to make concessions to others. A crucial premise, then, is that people are (ap-
proximately) equally strong, both in the strict sense (body strength) and in the broad 
sense, including mental capacities,75 which Hobbes takes from experience (implicitly76 
and explicitly77).
A circle seems to emerge, since Hobbes insists – arguing this as the ninth law 
of nature in Leviathan – that people acknowledge their mutual equality.78 After all, if 
this equality needs to be presupposed for the laws of nature to apply at all, it would 
be strange that it appears as one of the laws. Still, he maintains inequality (according 
to which people suppose themselves superior to others) to be against reason (and 
experience).79 This ninth ‘dictate of reason’ may then serve as a rule to counter the 
passion that lies at the root of this stance. The basic equality is located at a higher level 
and serves as a necessary condition for the human condition, whereas the situation 
covered by the ninth law of nature applies to man’s reflection once he finds himself 
confronted with this situation.
Because of the definition of ‘right of nature’ – man may use his power as he deems 
fit – if the mitigations presented by the ninth law of nature were absent, a more or less 
stable situation would ensue without the need to establish a sovereign power artificially. 
This is why it can be said: “[…] if there had been any man of power Irresistible; there 
had been no reason, why he should not by that power have ruled, and defended both 
himselfe, and [men], according to his own direction.”80 Apparently, this hypothetical 
man is presented as irresistibly powerful, but not as omnipotent, for notwithstanding 
his qualities, he still, so it is said, seeks to protect others, which can, with the general 
self-interested motivation in mind, only be explained if he needs their services, for 
whatever reason.
Conscience is mentioned as decisive in some occasions. The word ‘conscience’ 
may have a ‘moral’ connotation; it needs to be inquired how Hobbes uses this notion. 
He indicates that it would be against reason for someone to observe the laws of nature 
if others don’t, since this would make him vulnerable. In general, the laws of nature 
keep their force, but this doesn’t apply if they cannot safely serve as directives: “[…] 
the Law of Nature doth alwayes, and every where oblige in the internall Court, or that 
of Conscience, but not always in the externall Court, but then onely when it may be 
done with safety.”81
73 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 13 (89)
74 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 13 (90)
75 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 13 (86, 87)
76 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 13 (86, 87)
77 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 1, § 3 (45)
78 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (107)
79 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (107)
80 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 31 (247). Incidentally, in the religious dimension, such 
an instance is provided: “The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those 
that break his Lawes, is to be derived not from his Creating them, as if he required obedience, as of 
Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irresistible Power.” Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 31 (246).
81 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 3, § 27 (73)
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From what has already been said about the laws of nature and the meaning of the 
‘moral’ notions, it is clear that ‘conscience’ doesn’t add a ‘moral’ dimension. The ac-
count in Leviathan removes any ambiguity: “The Lawes of Nature oblige in foro interno; 
that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, 
to the putting them in act, not alwayes.”82 It is only possible to argue that conscience 
has a ‘moral’ meaning for Hobbes if one contributes a meaning to the word that is not 
mentioned or alluded to by him. Here, just as in the case of ‘moral philosophy’, ‘rea-
son’, ‘virtue’, and ‘justice’, (cf. notes 34, 50, 62, supra; 91, 92, infra), it is necessary to 
ascertain what Hobbes himself says without relying on preconceived meanings. The 
notions can be dubbed ‘moral’ concepts, but only if ‘moral’ is taken to mean ‘practical’.83 
The observation that “The laws of nature as moral rules always exert a claim on the 
human conscience to be disposed to comply with them, which can hardly be true of 
the motive of self-interest.”84 can only be correct if ‘conscience’ is interpreted in the 
traditional way, which Hobbes opposes.
Of the laws of nature, the first and third (following the Leviathan presentation) are 
the most important ones here. The first (fundamental) law of nature is: “[…] to seek 
Peace, and follow it.”,85 which follows from the general rule of reason “[…] That every 
man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it […].”86 ‘Ought’ 
does not point to a ‘moral’ obligation (except in Hobbes’s idiosyncratic sense) any 
more than ‘forbidden’ above would to a ‘moral’ prohibition, for Hobbes bases this rule 
of reason on man’s need (i. e., his self-interest) to evade the state of nature.87 One 
cannot link ‘ought’ to a (Kantian) deontology88 as long as one wants to remain close 
to what Hobbes actually says.
The third law of nature, which follows from the second – people mitigate their right 
to defend themselves to the same degree others do89 – is “[…] That men performe 
their Covenants made […].”90 This is a corollary to the motivation to evade the state of 
nature, no additional (‘moral’) grounds being present. This means that the notion ‘jus-
tice’ is equally ‘morally’ empty: “[…] in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and 
Originall of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been 
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can 
be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: and the definition 
of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant.”91 Justice is defined 
as keeping of covenant, and is “[…] a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to 
do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.”92 The same 
analysis of ‘forbidden’ as above applies here.
The coming about of a common-wealth is necessary because people don’t always 
act by means of reason; in fact, “[…] the Passions of men, are commonly more potent 
82 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (110); cf. The Elements of Law ([1650], 1840), Part 
1, Ch. 4, § 10 (108) and De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 1983), Ch. 4, § 21 (83).
83 Cf. David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (1969), 27, 67, and note 38, supra.
84 Perez Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature (2009), 105
85 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 14 (92)
86 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 14 (92)
87 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 14 (91)
88 Alfred Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes” (1938), 424
89 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 14 (92)
90 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (100)
91 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (100)
92 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (103); cf. Ch. 26 (185)
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than their Reason.”93 If reason were dominant in this regard, the laws of nature would 
be decisive and the state of nature would not be identical with the state of war; since 
these laws conflict with the passions, however, a common-wealth is necessary.94
This is the reason why Rousseau’s objection that one necessary yields to force, so 
that no duty would remain,95 is unwarranted: even irrespective of the fact, pointed out 
above, that Hobbes’s way of regarding notions such as ‘duty’ idiosyncratically (Rous-
seau doesn’t make it clear what exactly he means by duty (‘devoir’) here, but it seems 
that his position differs from Hobbes’s even at this level of inquiry), Hobbes’s analysis of 
one’s duty takes place at a level prior to the one Rousseau discusses; that level is one 
which follows once one has acted as one should, not succumbing to one’s passions 
but acting upon reason. Rousseau’s distinction between duty and prudence96 is, from 
Hobbes’s perspective, nonexistent.
The passions are considered ‘commonly’ to be more potent than reason. This seems 
to be more of an empirical observation than an axiom. It is significant since it relativizes 
the merit of the laws of nature in realizing peace.
In a common-wealth, general rules (by means of civil laws) are established, func-
tioning as the measure of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.97 This doesn’t mean that ‘moral’ standards 
are introduced, but only that a single source of rules of conduct is appointed, i. e., the 
sovereign. An artificial criterion for ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ actions is thus apparent.98 The 
subjects are not supposed to act from ‘moral’ intentions, for people only obey the laws 
out of fear,99 weighing the advantages and disadvantages of breaking it.100 The link 
with self-interest is clear.
A great number of issues have been brought together in the above sections; the 
pattern that is discernable will be demonstrated in the last section by ordering the most 
important premises.
4. A systematic construction
As was mentioned in the introduction, the (modest) scheme that exhibits the fundamen-
tals of Hobbes’s practical philosophy and the way they are interrelated is a construction. 
It is warranted, I think, because nothing is included that Hobbes hasn’t stated and the 
positions of the various parts follow from the respective importance that is attributed 
to his respective contentions.
In the first section it was argued that self-interest lies at the root of all voluntary and 
non-voluntary actions (cf. notes 19, 22, 23, supra). This is, therefore, the most basic 
given. It is an axiom since Hobbes doesn’t derive it from experience per se; as was 
said, it has a semantic rather than an empirical justification. The laws of nature are 
derived from the self-interested stance: it is through (right) reason that one finds out 
 93 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 19 (131)
 94 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 17 (117)
 95 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contract Social ([1762], 1964), Livre 1, Cap. 3 (354)
 96 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contract Social ([1762], 1964), Livre 1, Cap. 3 (354)
 97 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 29 (223); Ch. 46 (469)
 98 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 15 (100, 101); Ch. 30 (239)
 99 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 27 (206); cf. De Cive (the English version) ([1651], 
1983), Ch. 14, § 8 (173): “[…] in vain is that Law which may be broken without punishment.”
100 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ([1651], 2007), Ch. 27 (203)
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what the laws of nature are (cf. note 53, supra) and that one must continue to live (cf. 
notes 29, 48, supra).
If people were not (approximately) equally strong, these laws of nature would not 
be observed. It is only because the most powerful person is unable to overawe the rest 
that they compel (cf. note 80, supra). Since reason is not constantly one’s guide – one 
is usually rather driven by his passions (cf. note 93, supra) – the role of the passions 
needs to be taken into consideration, too. The laws of nature are theorems (cf. note 52, 
supra), so they are not themselves (self-evident) starting-points, but rather the result 
of a deliberation, being derived from a calculus of the pros and cons of acting in some 
way, deliberation consisting in this process (cf. notes 50, 51, supra). 
This applies not only to the first and third laws of nature, which were mentioned in 
section 3, but to all of them. They are (virtually) all necessarily (and explicitly) linked to 
peace, which is preferable to war and consequently to be pursued if one acts reasonably. 
The ‘moral’ notions retain their practical value, but are not linked to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ as 
supposedly absolute standards, allegedly deciding that an action be ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.
The construction is then along these lines:
1. Basis
– Axiom: Self-interest is ever decisive
– Premise (from experience): People are approximately equally strong
2. Corollary
– Definitional statement (claiming something about reason): Reason finds out what 
the laws of nature are
– Theorems: the laws of nature
– Premise (from experience): The laws of nature are observed
– Definitional statement: The strength of the ‘moral’ concepts depends on their expla-
nation of actual phenomena
3. Additional premise (from experience): The passions are more potent than reason
4. Conclusion: a political state (common-wealth) is necessary
Conclusion
In his realistic presentation of the human political condition, Hobbes makes it clear on 
what basis actions come about. A minimal explanation is provided, cleansed of any ‘moral’ 
elements, save those which Hobbes maintains in this guise, but in a specific sense. He 
thus puts forward a consistent account. It must be granted that the straightforward analysis 
comes at the expense that it is somewhat shallow. Still, his analysis proves interesting 
and at times compelling and those intent on combating its core cannot simply dismiss it.
It is not a matter of chance that Hobbes’s practical philosophy has been the topic 
of investigation; I have observed a number of parallels between his ideas and some of 
my own. I venture to claim that this has not interfered with an open interpretation in the 
sense that I have not molded his statements into something that can assuredly not be 
taken to represent his thoughts; that the danger that such a course of action would be 
taken is in Hobbes’s case slight, as he is usually clear, was already mentioned in the 
introduction. I leave it to the reader’s judgment whether some of the commentators on 
his philosophy have nonetheless fallen pray to said danger.
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